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Abstract. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a highly distributed net-
work of resource constrained and wireless devices called sensor nodes. In
the work we consider intrusion detection systems as they are proper
mechanisms to defend internal attacks on WSNs. A wide diversity of
WSN applications on one side and limited resources on other side implies
that \one-t-all" intrusion detection system is not optimal. We present
a conceptual proposal for a suite of tools that enable an automatic de-
sign of intrusion detection system that will be (near) optimal for a given
network topology, capabilities of sensor nodes and anticipated attacks.
1 Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of sensor nodes { devices that are
equipped with sensor(s), microcontroller, wireless transceiver and battery. Each
sensor node monitors some physical phenomenons (e.g., humidity, temperature,
pressure, light, etc.) inside an area of deployment. The collected measurements
are then sent to a base station { a gateway between a WSN and external world
(in most cases the Internet).
In the work we consider WSNs that contain hundreds of thousands of nodes
distributed over an area of hundreds square kilometers. Communication range of
sensor nodes is limited to tens of meters and hence not all of them can directly
communicate with a base station. Therefore, data are sent hop-by-hop from one
sensor node to another until they reach a base station (see Figure 1).
Sensor nodes are constrained in processing power and energy, whereas a base
station is assumed to have laptop capabilities and unlimited energy resources.
Crossbow MICAz1 is an example of average sensor node. It contains Atmel
Atmega128L microcontroller, 802.15.4 compliant (250kbps) Texas Instruments
CC2420 transceiver and two AA batteries. The microcontroller features 8b pro-
cessor (operating at 8MHz), 128kB FLASH, 4kB EEPROM and 4kB SRAM.
Currently the sensor node is available at price of e110. That eliminates de-
ployment of a large number of sensor nodes. However, it is believed that recent
advances in micro-electro-mechanical systems will decrease the cost signicantly.
1 See manufacturer's website http://www.xbow.com/.
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It is expected that WSNs will have many applications in military, ecology, build-
ing and industrial automation, energy management, agriculture and even wildlife
monitoring. Security becomes an important issue for WSNs and brings new chal-
lenges for security engineers.
Fig. 1: Wireless sensor network. A base station is depicted as the black lled
circle and sensor nodes are depicted as gray ones. We assume that communication
ranges (represented by dotted circles) of neighboring sensor nodes are symmetric.
Cryptographic techniques can be used to prevent an external attacker (out-
sider) [9] from eavesdropping or altering the ongoing communication2. Encryp-
tion does not solve the problem of jamming attacks, where a malicious node
(or other device) purposefully tries to interfere with physical transmission and
reception of wireless communication.
An area of deployment is most often not physically protected and an attacker
can easily access the area and capture some nodes3. Being a legitimate partici-
pant of the network the attacker (insider) can launch a variety of internal attacks.
In the work we consider: a selective forwarding attack in which an attacker se-
lectively drops packets [5]; a sinkhole attack in which an attacker attracts all
trac from a particular area towards itself, typically by making a compromised
node look attractive to neighboring nodes with respect to routing algorithm [5];
a packet alternation attack in which a malicious node modies packets that it
forwards for the neighbors.
Sensor nodes are not tamper-resistant and an attacker can extract crypto-
graphic keys from captured nodes. The attacker can replicate (also known as
clone attack) [6] the nodes, deploy them into a network and then launch attacks
described above. The attacker can also create nodes with several identities, also
known as Sybil nodes [5]. These nodes may have an impact on multipath routing,
voting, data aggregation, fair-resource allocation and misbehavior detection.
In this work we consider intrusion detection systems (IDSs) since they are,
in comparison to cryptographic techniques, better mechanisms to defend against
internal attacks on WSNs. In Section 2 we describe basics of intrusion detection
systems for wireless sensor networks { what kinds of audit data can be gathered
2 A survey on performance of symmetric/asymmetric cryptographic primitives and
hash functions implemented for WSNs is available in [8].
3 We assume that a number of such nodes is signicantly smaller than a total number
of sensor nodes in the network.
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and for detection of what types of attack they can be used. \One-t-all" IDS is
not optimal because of the wide range of WSN applications and limited resources
of sensor nodes. In Section 3 we propose a conceptual architecture of a suite of
tools that will provide administrators with an IDS that ts best its purposes.
2 Intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks
In the work we consider a distributed IDS that consists of IDS agents.We assume
that every sensor node runs an IDS agent which monitors its neighbors using both
local and watchdog monitoring techniques [1]. In the local monitoring technique
sensor nodes collect and analyze only data forwarded by themselves (see Figure
2a). In the watchdog technique, sensor nodes collect an analyze data overheard
in their neighborhood (see Figure 2b). We assume that sensor nodes employ
single-channel transceivers. However, if the multi-channel transceivers are used,
it might happen (the worst scenario) that the watchdog technique will be useless
and an IDS will have to rely only on the local monitoring technique.
A B C
(a) The sensor node B monitors trac
that it forwards from the node A to the
node C
A
B
C
(b) The sensor node B monitors in
promiscuous mode trac from the node
A to the node C
Fig. 2: Trac monitoring techniques
A conceptual model of an IDS agent is presented in [10]. Audit data gath-
ered by a local audit data collection module are subsequently analyzed by a local
detection module(s). A cooperative detection module is used to propagate intru-
sion detection state information or/and audit data among neighboring nodes. In
case a local detection evidence is weak or inconclusive the cooperative detection
module can use information (e.g., audit data) received from other IDS agents to
detect an ongoing attack. After the attack is detected local response and global
response modules trigger reactions. We assume that the local response mod-
ule will stop any communication with the malicious node. The global response
module will notify an administrator and he/she will remove or reprogram the
malicious node. A secure communication module should provide cooperating
nodes with a secure communication channel.
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We assume that IDS agents will be implemented for TinyOS { the most
widely used operating system for wireless sensor networks. It is important to
understand what kind of network audit information we can gather. In TinyOS,
the basic network abstraction is an active message that includes source and desti-
nation addresses [3]. Also it provides synchronous acknowledgements. Hardware
independent components (e.g., active message) are built on top of hardware de-
pendent components. Crossbow Imote2, MICAz and TELOSB sensor nodes as
well as Sentilla Tmote Sky sensor nodes use TI CC2420 transceiver4. The corre-
sponding CC2420 Radio Stack [4] supplies each outgoing message with a unique
data sequence number and also provides possibility to read RSSI (received signal
strength indication) of each received packet.
The audit data collection module logs source and destination addresses of
received, overheard and sent packets. Also it logs: RSSI of received packets as
well as information whether a packet passed CRC check or not; information
whether an attempt to send a packet was successful or not, whether a packet
was received by recipient (acknowledged) and how much time was spent waiting
for the channel (carrier sensing time). All this information is gathered for a
period of time of duration T and we call it temporal information. Having this
information, dierent temporal statistics can be calculated. Examples of such
statistics are presented below.
1. Packet delivery ratio { a ratio of packets that are successfully delivered to a
destination compared to a number of packets that were sent by the sender.
2. Packet sending rate { a number of packets sent by a neighboring sensor node.
3. Packet receiving rate { a number of packets received by a neighboring sensor
node.
4. Packet dropping rate { a ratio of packets sent by a neighboring sensor node
with respect to a number of packets received by that node.
5. Number of neighbors.
6. A function of RSSI (e.g., average, maximum).
7. A function of carrier sensing time (e.g., average, maximum).
Packet delivery ratio can be calculated either at the sender or at the receiver.
At the receiver it is calculated as a ratio of a number of packets that passed the
CRC check with respect to a number of packets received. At the sender it is
calculated as a ratio of a number of ACK received with respect to a number of
packets sent.
The calculated statistics can be used to detect dierent attacks. For example,
carrier sensing time, packet delivery ratio and RSSI are used to detect jamming
attacks [2]. Selective forwarding attacks can be detected by monitoring packet
dropping rate [1]. Packet receiving ratio can be used to detect sinkhole attacks.
4 We consider these radio chips since they are 802.11.4 compliant and provide hardware
support of AES.
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3 Intrusion detection system ts to purpose
Density of a network, capabilities of involved sensor nodes, anticipated types of
attack and other critical parameters may vary from one application to another.
Due to a wide range of WSN applications on one side and limited resources on
other side a \one-t-all" IDS is not optimal. Therefore, we propose to make a
two-level optimization.
1. In order to detect dierent attacks a variety of local detection modules
can be implemented. An administrator will specify anticipated attacks and we
propose to include only such detection modules in the IDS agent that detect
the specied attacks. This approach will save memory and energy that are very
important for WSNs. To our best knowledge nobody has yet applied such idea
to WSNs.
2. Parameters of detection modules (included in the IDS agent conguration)
might not be optimal for a given application. We propose to optimize them for
a network topology, sensor nodes capabilities and anticipated types of attack,
which all will be specied by a network administrator. In conventional networks,
in majority of cases, a trade-o between a number of false positives, a number
of false negatives and memory usage is found. However, for WSNs this is not
enough. Sensor nodes are energy constrained and if ever depleted they will stop
fullling their main goal { monitoring of area of deployment. Therefore, for WSNs
a trade-o between detection accuracy, memory usage and energy usage should
be found. For example, if IDS agents cooperate between themselves it involves
communication, which in comparison with computation, consumes signicantly
more energy [7]. On other side cooperation increases a detection accuracy since
a single monitoring node may not have enough information to detect an attack,
e.g., due to collisions [1].
We propose a suite of tools that should provide an administrator of a network
with a (near) optimal IDS. The suite includes Framework and Simulator (see
Figure 3). A network administrator provides descriptions of network topology,
sensor node characteristics and anticipated attacks to the Framework. It contains
a database of available components which will be used to compose an IDS agent.
To make automatic design of an IDS agent possible we should specify types
of component that can be used and interfaces between them. The rst step
is to design a local audit collection module that will gather audit data that
might be \ever" required by any detection module. We have undertaken the
analysis of state-of-the-art IDSs for WSNs and possible audit data ever met
in the studied literature have been described in Section 2. In the worst case, if
some detection module needs audit data that are not gathered by the local audit
collection module, the collection module should be designed in such way that an
administrator will be able to add the required functionality easily.
There are dierent detection modules among the components in the database.
Based on the specied attacks the Framework generates a possible conguration
of the IDS agent. The conguration will be optimized using the Simulator in
the following way. The Framework sets initial values of parameters and evaluates
eectiveness of the conguration using metrics, examples of which we describe
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further in the section. Based on the evaluation the Framework \improves" the
values of parameters and repeats the procedure until they become (near) op-
timal for given network topology, capabilities of sensor nodes and anticipated
attacks. Should there are more than one possible conguration each of them is
optimized separately. Evaluations of optimized congurations can be used by an
administrator to choose the one that ts best its purposes.
Fig. 3: An architecture of the proposed suite of tools. The arrow with number
\1" depicts inputs provided by an administrator. The arrow \2" depicts a con-
guration that is passed to the Simulator. The arrow \3" depicts a feedback
on eectiveness of the conguration based on evaluating metrics. The arrow \4"
depicts an optimized conguration and its evaluation of eectiveness.
In order to understand how to evaluate an IDS we will rstly analyze attacks
and their impacts on a network. Sinkhole attacks result in data receiving delays
and additional energy usage because data do not travel along the shortest path.
Let us assume that each node shares a cryptographic key with a base station as
well as each node sends packet and waits for its acknowledgement. If a packet
is modied along the path a base station may drop the packet and request to
resend it again. That will cause a packet delay and additional usage of energy.
If the packet is modied again and again it will not be ever delivered to the
base station. Selective forwarding attack may result in sending the dropped
packet again and again. Similarly as in the packet alternation attack, that can
cause delays and additional energy usage. If a jamming attack lasts too long a
packet will be dropped if a new packet arrives and buer is full. To sum up, the
considered attacks may cause losses of packets, modications of packets, delivery
delays and additional energy usage.
The main goal of IDS is to detect ongoing attacks and respond in such a way
that the impact of the attacks will be minimal. The presented examples of metrics
evaluate the impact of the sinkhole, selective forwarding, packet alternation and
jamming attacks as well as an eectiveness of a given IDS. The smaller the
measured impact is, the more eective IDS is. We assume that all of the metrics
will be measured during a period of time of duration Q (Q 2 R+). The parameter
Q will be chosen by an administrator.
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1. We propose to count the number of lost packets as a dierence between
a number of packets sent by sensor nodes and a number of packets successfully
received by a base station. The packets may get lost due to collisions, buer
overows and environment changes. We assume that a number of packets lost in
such way is constant for each time interval of duration Q if Q is long enough.
It is noteworthy to mention that an increase of number of detected malicious
nodes does not necessary mean that a number of successfully received packets
will increase as well. Having a smaller number of nodes an attacker can change
the strategy and drop/modify/jam more packets than before.
2. We propose to count the number of modied packets received at the base
station. Packets that had been modied and hence were subsequently dropped
are not counted as they are considered as lost. We can extend the metric by
introducing a function that will determine how much the original packet diers
from the modied one. An administrator will specify the function and thereby
specify what packet elds are more critical than others.
3. We propose to evaluate the total amount of energy used by the network by
summing up energy used by each sensor node. However, the metric does not take
into account a distribution of energy usage { some sensor nodes may be depleted
soon whereas others may remain fully charged. That may cause partition of
a network and measurements from isolated regions of the network will never
reach a base station. Such packets will be considered as lost. In order to avoid
such situations we propose to use a metric that prioritizes IDSs which detect and
respond to attacks in such way that energy consumption is distributed uniformly
as much as possible. As an example of the metric we consider  =
Pn
i=1 c
ei ,
where n is a number of sensor nodes in a network, ei is an amount of energy
consumed by sensor node i, (1  i  n) and c (c 2 R; c > 1) is a constant that
should be specied by an administrator.
4 Conclusions and further work
IDSs are useful for dierent networks since there are no guaranties that an at-
tacker remains outside a perimeter secured by a rewall. In WSNs risks of being
attacked by an insider are higher than in conventional networks since the area
of their deployment is most often not physically protected. Due to a distributed
nature of WSNs and severe limitations of sensor nodes on energy, memory and
computation power, traditional IDSs are not applicable to the WSNs. Moreover,
\one-t-all" IDS is far away from being optimal for a given network topology,
capabilities of sensor nodes and set of anticipated attacks in terms of detection
accuracy and resources consumption. Therefore, the aim of our work was to pro-
pose a conceptual architecture of a suite of tools that will provide a network
operator with a (near) optimal IDS for a given application. The optimalization
process was divided into two steps. The rst will save memory and energy by
including into an IDS agent only modules that are used for detection of antici-
pated attacks. The second will nd a trade-o between detection accuracy and
resources consumption by setting parameters of detection modules and evalu-
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ating the conguration according to the dened metrics using a simulator. The
proposed metrics evaluate impact of sinkhole, selective forwarding, packet al-
ternation and jamming attacks by counting a number of lost/modied packets
and energy consumed by a network. The smaller the measured impact is, the
more eective an IDS is. The list of metrics is not complete and we currently
extend it as well as add a classication of types of components that can be used
to construct an IDS agent and dene interfaces between them. We also plan to
work on the selection of a proper optimization algorithm and a proper simulator.
Since the space of possible solutions might be too large for exhaustive search,
approximation algorithms might be used. Evaluation of the implemented suite
of tools will be based on the time needed to nd (near) optimal solution and on
how close the obtained solution is to the optimal one.
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